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HE TEXAS LEGISLATURE is considering a new corporate in-
come tax credit for research and development (R&D) spend-
ing within the state. Economists generally believe society
benefits when government encourages R&D. The federal
government and more than one-third of the states currently
offer corporate tax credits to subsidize R&D. Is an R&D tax
credit a good idea for Texas? And what would be the best way to
structure such a credit?
Roughly $221 billion was spent on R&D activities in the United
States in 1998, according to the National Science Foundation. As a
share of gross domestic product (GDP), R&D investment was ap-
proximately 2.6 percent in 1998. Relative to GDP, the United States
spends slightly less on R&D than Japan, but more than Germany, the
United Kingdom, Canada and Italy.
Of total U.S. R&D spending in 1998, 15 percent funded basic re-
search—original investigations for the advancement of scientific
knowledge that generally do not have specific commercial objec-
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that have specific commercial objec-
tives. The other 62 percent of R&D
spending went to development—the
systematic use of the knowledge gained
from research directed toward pro-
duction of useful materials, devices, sys-
tems or methods, including design and
development of prototypes and pro-
cesses.
The private sector funds the majority
of R&D activity in the United States. In
1998, industry funded $144 billion, the
federal government funded $67 billion,
and state and local governments, uni-
versities and nonprofit institutions
funded $10 billion of R&D activity. Fed-
eral research funding as a percent of
GDP has declined over the last decade
because of the sharp cutback in de-
fense-related research.
Motivation for Encouraging Research
Economists generally oppose tax in-
centives or subsidies limited to specific
categories of investment because they
believe the free market and a neutral
tax system—one that treats all busi-
nesses equally—will direct resources to
the uses with the highest return. This
does not apply, however, to invest-
ments that yield spillover benefits—
gains to society that the firm making the
investment cannot capture. Some forms
of research, such as biotechnology, can
produce significant spillover benefits.
For example, if a pharmaceutical firm
invests in a new factory and produces
more medicine, it can capture the re-
sulting social benefit by selling the
medicine. But if the firm invests in a 
research project and discovers a new
medicine, its profits may not fully re-
flect the resulting benefit to society. The
firm can capture part of the social bene-
fit by patenting the new medicine and
collecting royalties from its users for a
limited period, but there are likely to be
spillover benefits the firm cannot cap-
ture. Others can freely exploit the ideas
embedded in the discovery for other
purposes and can produce the new
medicine after the patent expires. As a
result, the firm may find the new factory
more profitable than the research pro-
ject, even though the research project
has higher total benefits to society.
Thus, society can benefit if government
provides a subsidy that induces the firm
to undertake the research project.
Studies estimate that research can
have extremely high spillover benefits.
For example, Charles Jones and John
Williams estimate that R&D spending
offers a total return for society of 30
percent per year, compared with 7 per-
cent for other investment. They con-
clude that R&D spending should be
increased by at least a factor of four.
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Federal Research Incentives
The federal government employs
both direct funding and broad tax in-
centives for private research. Direct
funding is generally used to subsidize
research that has very low private re-
turns and very high spillover benefits,
because firms are reluctant to engage in
such research, even with incentives.
Basic research often falls into this cate-
gory. In 1998, the federal government
funded roughly 30 percent of the na-
tion’s total R&D investment, but 57 per-
cent of basic research.
Tax incentives may be appropriate
for research that has a commercial ap-
plication and a significant private re-
turn, but also has a spillover benefit. In
these cases, firms will engage in some
research without a tax incentive, but
less than is socially optimal. The federal
government provides two tax benefits
for research spending. First, firms may
deduct R&D costs when they are in-
curred (expense them) rather than amor-
tize them over the period in which the
firm expects to profit from the research.
Second, some costs qualify for a 20-per-
cent research and experimentation
(R&E) credit. In fiscal 1998, firms doing
research reduced their federal tax lia-
bility by $300 million by expensing re-
search costs and by another $2.1 billion
by using the R&E credit.
How the Federal Tax Credit Works
Although a wide range of research
costs may be expensed, the R&E credit
has been limited (since 1986) to “quali-
fied research expenses” that meet sev-
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benefit.eral criteria specified by Congress.
These criteria, summarized in the box,
generally exclude development, which
Congress felt had little spillover benefit.
Since firms do little basic research, the
credit largely benefits applied research.
Many of the criteria are subjective, and
the IRS and firms continue to dispute
their interpretation.
The federal R&E credit is a temporary
provision, which keeps firms uncertain
about its long-term availability. It has
been renewed nine times since its en-
actment in 1981. In four cases, the credit
was extended before it expired. In the
other five cases, the extension was
adopted as long as 417 days after the
expiration. In four of those cases, the
credit was reinstated retroactively to its
expiration date. But in one case, after
the credit expired on June 30, 1995, 
the extension was unexpectedly made
retroactive only to July 1, 1996, denying
any credit for expenses in the preceding
year. The nine extensions have been for
periods ranging from six to 36 months.
The credit expires again on June 30, 1999.
The R&E credit is an incremental
credit, applying only to qualified re-
search expenses in excess of a base
amount. During 1981–89, the credit
used a rolling base period, in which
each firm’s base amount in each year
depended on its research spending dur-
ing the preceding three years. The
credit now uses a fixed base period.
Each firm’s base amount equals its av-
erage gross receipts during the previous
four years multiplied by the 1984–88
ratio of its qualified research expenses
to its gross receipts (special rules apply
to firms established since 1984).
Manufacturing firms claim approxi-
mately three-quarters of the credit, with
the largest amounts going to the phar-
maceutical, electrical equipment, trans-
portation equipment and machinery
industries. Many military and aerospace
firms receive little benefit from the
credit because their current research
spending is below their 1984–88 levels.
Large firms claim the bulk of the credit.
2
How Do States Encourage Research?
Nearly all states provide some tax re-
lief for companies investing in research
and development. A quick overview of
the bewildering variety of state tax rules
provides a vivid reminder of the burden
placed on firms complying with multi-
ple state tax codes. Many states provide
exemptions or credits against sales or
property tax for R&D investment.
3
Forty-five states, including Texas, im-
pose a corporate income tax.
4 All of
these states allow research costs to be
expensed, but, as shown in Chart 1, only
21 of them provide R&D credits. Each
state’s credit applies only to research
conducted within the state. The Missis-
sippi and Vermont credits are linked to
R&D employment, and the New York
credit is linked to purchases of R&D
equipment. The other 18 state credits
apply to R&D spending.
As Table 1 details, these 18 state R&D
tax credits are nearly all incremental,
with substantially different marginal
credit rates and base periods. West Vir-
ginia uses a nonincremental credit,
while Connecticut allows firms to claim
both an incremental credit and a nonin-
cremental credit. Five states use rolling
base periods, 11 states use a 1984–88
fixed base period (the same as the fed-
eral credit), and Maine uses both a roll-
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Federal Definition of
“Qualified Research Expenses”
Research must consist of a “process
of experimentation” in engineering, phys-
ics, biology or computer science and
must seek “technological” information not
commonly known to skilled professionals.
The research effort need not be success-
ful. The information sought must be useful
in developing a “new or improved” busi-
ness product or technique and must re-
late to function, performance, reliability or
quality, and not style. The credit does not
apply to “reverse engineering,” market 
research, routine quality control or re-
search following commercial production.
The credit applies to the cost of re-
search supplies and wages paid to work-
ers performing, supervising or supporting
research, but not to payments for land,
structures or equipment (except pay-
ments to lease computers). Research
must be conducted within the United
States and cannot be funded by grants.








development.ing and a fixed base period (1995–97).
The number of firms claiming the credit
and the total amount claimed vary widely
among states. Missouri and Pennsyl-
vania impose statewide limits on the
amount of credit available, providing
the credit to firms on a first-come, first-
served basis. The California credit is the
largest in absolute terms, with over
1,700 firms claiming $314 million.
The R&D credits are nonrefundable,
so firms cannot use the credit in excess
of their tax liability. Many states further
limit the credit to a fraction of tax lia-
bility, which curtails the credit for many
firms in states with higher credit rates.
The state credits usually apply to the
“qualified research expenses” that re-
ceive the federal credit, but Connecticut
and Kansas provide credits for any re-
search spending that the federal tax
code allows to be expensed. The West
Virginia credit includes payments for
land, structures and equipment (all ex-
cluded from the federal definition), but
the credit is only available to firms that
produce manufacturing and natural re-
source products or electric power. The
North Carolina credit is also limited to
particular industrial sectors, primarily
manufacturing and software firms.
The types of industries claiming the
credit are generally similar to those
claiming the federal credit. Seed com-
panies are important users of the Iowa
credit. Large firms generally receive
most of the credits.
Advantages and Disadvantages
of Incremental Credit
The federal credit and most state
credits are designed to subsidize only
the incremental increase in R&D spend-
ing. The primary advantage of an incre-
mental credit is that it can provide
greater marginal incentives with lower
revenue losses (more bang for the
buck). The ideal incremental credit
would set each firm’s base amount
equal to the amount of research that the
firm would have done without any
credit. For example, a firm that would
spend $100 on R&D without any credit
could be offered a 20-percent credit for
any R&D spending in excess of $100.
This credit offers a 20-percent marginal
incentive for R&D spending but at
much lower revenue cost than a 20-per-
cent nonincremental credit. If the firm
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Chart 1
States Offering R&D Tax Credits
(Corporate Income Tax)
States with no corporate income tax Other states (21) (5) (24) States with corporate income tax R&D tax credit







spending.increases its research spending to $110,
this credit has a revenue loss of $2. A
20-percent nonincremental credit should
stimulate the same increase in R&D
spending (since the marginal incentive
is the same), but the revenue loss
would be $22. The incremental credit is
cheaper because it does not give the
firm $20 to encourage research that it
was going to do anyway.
Unfortunately, real-world incremen-
tal credits do not work as well as hypo-
thetical examples. To calculate an in-
cremental credit, each firm’s base amount
is linked to its past research spending,
which can be a poor estimate of the
amount it would have spent today with-
out the credit. If the firm in the above
example were assigned a $70 base
amount and spends $110 on R&D, a 20-
percent incremental credit would be $8.
This amount is much larger than 
the ideal incremental credit. More dis-
turbingly, if the firm were assigned a
$130 base amount, it would continue to
spend $100 because it would receive no
subsidy for increasing its spending to
$110. The lack of marginal incentives
for firms with high base amounts re-
duces the overall stimulus to research
and distorts the allocation of research
across firms, since research at high-
base-amount firms may have large
spillover benefits.
Of course, the incremental credit is
also more complex than a credit that
applies to all qualified research spend-
ing, because firms and the IRS must 
reconstruct baseline R&D spending.
Rules must also specify the treatment of
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  5
Table 1
State Corporate Income Tax Credits for R&D Spending
Credit
Marginal amount
Took rate Number (millions
State effect (percent) Base period of firms of dollars) Expiration
Arizona 1994 20, 0
1 1984–1988 81 7 2003
California 1987 11 1984–1988 1,704 314 P
Connecticut 1993 20 Preceding year 236 21 P
0 1993 1, 2, 4, 6
2 NI 177 9 P
Illinois 1990 6.5 3 preceding years N/A 35 1999
Indiana 1989 5 1984–1988 37 15 1999
Iowa 1983 6.5 1984–1988 N/A N/A P
Kansas 1988 4.33 2 preceding years 47 1 2000
Maine 1996 5 3 preceding years 10 1 P
0 1998 100 1995–1997 N/A N/A P
Massachusetts 1991 10 1984–1988 817 62 P
Minnesota 1987 5, 2.5
3 1984–1988 268 17 P
Missouri 1994 6.5, 0
4 3 preceding years 67 16
5 P
New Jersey 1994 10 1984–1988 150 19 P
North Carolina 1996 5 1984–1988 N/A N/A 2001
North Dakota 1988 8, 4
6 1984–1988 < 5 < .5 P
Oregon 1989 5, 0
7 1984–1988 80 8 2001
Pennsylvania 1997 10 4 preceding years 299 15
8 2004
West Virginia 1986 10 NI 5–10 1–2 P
Wisconsin 1986 5 1984–1988 170 12 P
1 Arizona credit is 20 percent of creditable spending but cannot exceed $500,000.
2 Connecticut nonincremental credit is 1 percent of first $50 million of spending plus 2 percent of next $50 million plus 4
percent of next $100 million plus 6 percent of additional spending.
3 Minnesota credit is 5 percent of first $2 million of creditable spending plus 2.5 percent of additional creditable spending.
4 Missouri credit is 6.5 percent of creditable spending, but with no additional credit for spending in excess of double the
base amount.
5 Starting in 1999, Missouri limits statewide credits to $10 million.
6 North Dakota credit is 8 percent of first $1.5 million of creditable spending plus 4 percent of additional creditable spending.
7 Oregon credit is 5 percent of creditable spending but cannot exceed $500,000.
8 Pennsylvania limits statewide credits to $15 million.
NOTES: Table does not reflect all details of each state credit. Credit rates refer to 1998; number of firms and credit amount
generally refer to 1996 or 1997. Connecticut and Maine each allow firms to claim two credits. NI: Nonincremental
credit. P: Permanent credit. N/A: Not available.
SOURCES: Texas State Comptroller; Technology Business Council; state revenue departments; authors’ analysis of state
statutes and tax forms.




to its past research
spending, which




without the credit.firms’ base amounts during mergers and
spin-offs.
How Do Tax Credits
Affect Firms’ R&D Decisions?
Several studies have attempted to esti-
mate the effect of the federal tax credit
on business behavior. In general, the
evidence suggests that the credit has in-
creased R&D spending, but the size of
the impact is uncertain and the spillover
benefits from the additional R&D have
not been estimated.
In 1996, the General Accounting Office
surveyed eight studies that examined
the effects of the federal R&E tax credit.
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All studies concluded that the credit 
increased R&D spending, but the esti-
mated magnitude of the increase dif-
fered greatly. Four studies estimated
that R&D spending induced by the
credit exceeded its revenue loss (by a
factor as high as two), while the other
studies suggested that the increase in
R&D was smaller than the revenue loss.
None of the studies specifically meas-
ured the spillover benefits from the 
research induced by the credit or deter-
mined which types of research had
been increased.
There has been virtually no examina-
tion of the effectiveness of state R&D
credits. If R&D is sensitive to incentives,
as suggested by the studies of the fed-
eral credit, then state credits may also
stimulate R&D, although the credits may
just induce firms to relocate R&D from
one state to another.
Firms look at many factors when
making location and investment deci-
sions. Land and construction costs, the
location of suppliers, distribution facili-
ties and labor, as well as natural ameni-
ties, such as climate, all contribute to a
state’s attractiveness for investment.
Government regulations, overall tax
level and tax structure, and the mix of
available public services, such as roads
and education quality, also influence
corporate decision making. Although it
is possible that an R&D tax credit could
tip the balance in this process, the value
of state R&D tax credits is relatively
small compared with the huge invest-
ment necessary for most research pro-
jects. In fact, each state R&D credit
amount is generally about 1 percent or
less of total R&D spending in the state.
Even in states with credit rates compa-
rable with the 20-percent federal rate,
firms are likely to have insufficient tax
liabilities to fully use the credits, al-
though they can carry them forward.
In fact, although new R&D tax cred-
its have been adopted recently in some
states, there also has been movement in
the other direction, in part because of
concern that the credits are ineffective.
New Hampshire’s R&D credit was re-
cently allowed to expire, and the Mis-
souri legislature is considering a pro-
posal to suspend the state’s R&D credit.
A Texas R&D Credit?
Texas ranks sixth among states in the
amount of R&D performed by industry,
according to 1995 data gathered by the
National Science Foundation. The five
states with more R&D—California,
Michigan, New York, New Jersey and
Massachusetts—either have no corpo-
rate income tax or offer an R&D credit.
Can Texas benefit from subsidizing
R&D activities within the state? As noted
above, most economists believe that the
public benefits of R&D are greater than
the private benefits, suggesting that it
may be appropriate public policy to
subsidize these expenditures. But no
studies have evaluated the benefits to a
state that subsidizes R&D investment.
Although a state subsidy might stimu-
late additional R&D spending and pro-
duce spillover benefits, it is not clear
that the spillover benefits would accrue
in that state. A state might profit from
letting other states provide the subsidies
and enjoying the spillover benefits from
the additional research in those states,
without imposing revenue losses on its
own firms and residents. If a state R&D
credit merely changes the location of
R&D activity, there would be no
spillover benefits in the form of addi-
tional innovation. In this case, there
might be little economic rationale for a
state R&D credit.
Of course, a state R&D tax credit
would create additional jobs and in-
come in industries performing R&D,
much as a municipal subsidy for the






decisions.construction of a sports stadium would
create additional jobs and income in
sports-related industries. But such in-
centives may not stimulate an area’s
economic growth as effectively as
broad-based incentives for job creation.
Some economists have argued that 
a state should design its incentives to 
attract well-educated high-wage workers
because they may provide greater eco-
nomic benefits for the state. Clearly, an
R&D credit would tend to attract these
types of workers. Even so, it may be
more efficient to provide incentives for
all firms hiring well-educated workers,
rather than only firms that conduct re-
search. Adding tax preference for firms
engaging in research requires increas-
ing the tax burden on other firms, who
may hire equally valuable workers.
If Texas adopts an R&D tax credit,
the state should consider a nonincre-
mental credit, which would be more
neutral than an incremental credit be-
cause it would offer the same percentage
marginal subsidy to any firm investing
in research and development. A nonin-
cremental credit would also be easier to
administer.
As is true for the federal credit, man-
ufacturing firms are expected to be the
largest recipients of a Texas R&D credit.
As shown in Chart 2, if Texas adopted a
nonincremental credit, manufacturing
industries—mostly firms producing 
automobiles and parts, chemicals and
telecommunications equipment—would
receive over 70 percent of the credit.
Service firms, like software developers
and research labs, would also benefit.
The allocation of the credit would be
slightly different if Texas adopted an 
incremental R&D credit. The share of
the benefits going to manufacturing in-
dustries would be still higher, 78.5 per-
cent, and the share accruing to most
other firms would be smaller. Service
firms would receive 8.5 percent of an
incremental credit, while transportation,
communications and utilities firms would
receive roughly 8 percent.
6
Summary
Federal incentives for research and
development activities may be a good
investment because research may pro-
duce spillover benefits for society in 
addition to the private benefits accruing
to the firm performing the research. It is
less clear whether the same is true for 
a state subsidizing research within its
borders.
Even when state R&D subsidies in-
crease nationwide research, not enough
of the spillover benefits may accrue to
an individual state to warrant the reve-
nue loss of a credit. When research in-
centives merely shift the location of
research activities, they generate no
spillover benefits in the form of addi-
tional innovation. A state R&D credit
could generate indirect spillover bene-
fits by attracting well-educated or high-
wage workers, but this goal might be
achieved more efficiently through broad-
based incentives for the hiring of such
workers in all industries.
If Texas adopts an R&D credit, it
should consider using a nonincremental
credit because it would be easier to 
administer and would offer the same
percentage subsidy to R&D investment
by any firm.
— Fiona Sigalla
Alan D. Viard s Notes
1 Charles I. Jones and John C. Williams, “Measuring the Social Return
to R&D,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1998, pp.
1119–35.
2 Office of Technology Assessment, “The Effectiveness of Research
and Experimentation Tax Credits,” Congress of the United States,
September 1995, pp. 18–20.
3 The State Science and Technology Institute provided a detailed list of
state research and development tax incentives available in 1996.
4 The Texas corporate franchise tax is based partly on capital or net 
assets and partly on earned surplus or net income.
5 General Accounting Office, Review of Studies of the Effectiveness of
the Research Tax Credit, GAO-GGD-96-43, May 1996. One of the
eight studies actually examined the effects of tax rules related to re-
search by multinational firms rather than the R&E tax credit.
6 The authors thank Craig Doherty of the Texas Comptroller’s Office for
these estimates.
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NOTES: Percentages sum to less than 100 percent because of rounding.TCPU is transportation, communications and
public utilities and FIRE is finance, insurance and real estate.
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he U.S. economy is in the posi-
tion of the man who, while
standing with one foot on hot
coals and the other on a block
of ice, said, “On average, I feel
fine.” We have seen the nation’s
traded-goods sector go cold while its
nontraded sector has heated up. On
net, growth has been robust. The diver-
gence between the traded and non-
traded sectors makes forecasting the
economy unusually difficult. Financial
market turbulence is also a concern, 
although the financial market squeeze
that seemed to threaten the expansion
during the fall of 1998 now appears
more aptly described as a credit “pinch”
than a credit “crunch.” Our best guess is
that we will see further solid output
gains in 1999, with inflation rising only
a little from 1998’s low levels.
A Review of the Economy’s
Recent Performance
The current expansion is now nearly
eight years old, and second in length
only to the expansion of the 1960s. (To
match the 1960s expansion, we’ll have
to hold out through January of the year
2000.) More and more, the 1960s are
the standard against which this econ-
omy must be compared. Both unem-
ployment and inflation are at their
lowest levels since the days of bell- 
bottoms, granny glasses and tie-dyed 
T-shirts. The big question is whether 
we can expect this performance to con-
tinue in the wake of the Asian crisis and
its Russian and Brazilian aftershocks.
So far, the Asian crisis has been good
news for U.S. consumers. The collapse
of demand in Asia has meant that sud-
denly workers and equipment that were
being used to satisfy the wants of
households overseas have been freed
up to produce goods for households
here in the United States. Given an op-
portunity to purchase an abundance of
goods at low prices, U.S. consumers
have gone on a buying binge.
As Chart 1 shows, the contribution
that real consumer spending makes to
growth in U.S. gross domestic product
(GDP) increased sharply as the Asian
crisis unfolded, rising from an average
of about 2 percentage points during the
first six years of this expansion to about
3 percentage points during the second
half of 1997 to more than 4 percentage
points in the first half of 1998. However,
in recent quarters we have seen con-
sumer spending growth begin to decel-
erate. This shift to slower growth is only
natural: households have been given a
chance to stock up at what is essentially
a fire or going-out-of-business sale. The
start of the sale brought a surge of
spending, but now the pace of buying
is leveling off.
Ordinarily, booming consumer spend-
ing would mean good times for U.S.
manufacturers. But when domestic con-
sumption is booming partly because of
a collapse of overseas demand, U.S. ex-
porters—and those U.S. manufacturers
who compete against foreign exporters
—face tough sledding. As shown in
Chart 2, the trade drag on U.S. GDP
growth rose from about 0.25 percentage
point, on average, during the first six
years of this expansion to about 0.5 per-
centage point in the second half of 1997
and then exploded to 2.5 percentage
points in the first half of 1998. In the
second half of 1998, the drag from trade
showed signs of fading.
In the labor market, the effects of
booming consumer demand have offset
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce (Bureau of
Economic Analysis); authors’ calculations.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce (Bureau of
Economic Analysis); authors’ calculations.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor
Statistics); authors’ calculations.pair of bars on the left-hand side of
Chart 3 shows that the rate of job
growth over the past nine months has
slightly exceeded the average pace of
growth over the first seven years of the
current expansion. But under this placid
surface are strong crosscurrents. Em-
ployment in the traded-goods-producing
sector has begun to decline, whereas
employment growth in the nontraded
sector (the construction and service-
producing industries) has accelerated.
To get a feel for which of these
trends will dominate during the remain-
der of 1999, we can look at the signals
being sent by various leading economic
indicators.
The Outlook for Output Growth
Studies have shown that real (infla-
tion-adjusted) stock prices, the slope of
the yield curve (the difference between
long-term and short-term interest rates)
and the real money supply each have
useful information for the strength of
the economy one to four quarters 
into the future. Other indicators are of 
little or no help at these horizons once
stock prices, the slope of the yield
curve and the money supply are taken
into account.
Stock prices reflect the confidence
people feel about the future health of
the economy. However, stock prices are
often volatile and sometimes signal re-
cessions that don’t actually materialize.
Banks find it difficult to make prof-
itable loans when long-term interest
rates are low relative to short-term rates.
A flat yield curve can signal that policy-
makers have explicitly tightened credit
by raising the federal funds rate, or
have implicitly tightened credit by hold-
ing short-term rates constant in the face
of declines in expected inflation or
falling demand for credit.
The real money supply measures the
amount of liquid, spendable wealth in
people’s hands. It also indicates how
successful banks and money market
mutual funds have been at attracting
deposits that can be turned around and
loaned to consumers and businesses.
The “credit head winds” of the early
1990s were associated with unusu-
ally weak money supply growth. Sure
enough, output and employment ex-
panded sluggishly, despite rising stock
prices and a steep yield curve.
The green line in Chart 4 plots out-
put growth over six-month periods,
measured by the Conference Board’s
composite Coincident Index. Growth in
this index behaves a lot like GDP
growth, but is available monthly. The
brown line plots output growth pre-
dicted nine months before the fact
using stock prices, money growth and
the yield curve. The forecasting model
misses a few big upward spikes in
growth and underestimates the depth of
recessions, but it gives several months’
advance warning of every recent reces-
sion except that of 1990, which was 
arguably triggered by Iraq’s sudden in-
vasion of Kuwait.
Based on data through December
1998, the model predicts 3.6-percent
growth in the Coincident Index during
the second and third quarters of 1999—
little changed from the 3.4-percent aver-
age growth during 1998 and substan-
tially above the 2-percent real GDP
growth predicted by the average private
forecaster for those same two quarters.
If the model’s past performance is rep-
resentative, the odds of negative growth
during the spring and summer of 1999
are only about 1 in 20.
The Outlook for Inflation
Output growth is only half the eco-
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bit above the 0.9-percent rate of infla-
tion we saw in 1998. Based on historical
experience, chances are 50 percent that
inflation will lie between 0.75 percent
and 1.75 percent, and the odds that in-
flation will turn into outright deflation
or that inflation will exceed 2.5 percent
are each less than 1 in 20. Again, the 
average private forecaster is not quite
so optimistic, expecting inflation to accel-
erate to a 1.7-percent annual rate.
Risks to the Economic Outlook
Risks to our forecast are substantial.
With other sectors already straining
against capacity, further declines in
manufacturing and mining may not be
fully offset by growth elsewhere in the
economy. Additional pressure on U.S.
manufacturers might come from further
deterioration in Asia, the spread of the
Asian and Brazilian troubles to Mexico
or a slowdown in Europe. 
Even without further contagion, calls
for the government to protect domestic
firms from foreign competition can be
expected to intensify. Moving away
from free trade would certainly do the
nation harm in the long run and might
put upward pressure on inflation in the
short run.
Finally, concerns about their own 
financial health and that of others have
led some banks and investors to be-
come more wary in lending and to put
an increased premium on liquidity. Such
concerns might have been triggered by
a deepening economic slowdown over-
seas or by other signals of a less opti-
mistic outlook for loan quality and
profits. They could adversely affect the
economic outlook in ways our forecast-
ing models don’t fully capture. Specifi-
cally, they give rise to two financial
risks: a stock market plunge or a credit
crunch. Indeed, the Federal Reserve
eased monetary policy in late 1998
partly to counter mounting signs that
these very risks could cause the econ-
omy to slow too much.
A stock market plunge can slow the
economy in three ways. First, firms
have more difficulty issuing new equity,
and managers face pressure to bolster
their stock prices by boosting near-term
earnings through cutting payroll and in-
tion. Probably the most important factor
affecting inflation is the inflation expec-
tations that are built into labor con-
tracts. Ideally, we would recognize that
these expectations depend on past and
anticipated future money growth. In
practice, economists often approximate
inflation expectations by taking an aver-
age of past inflation. Other factors affect-
ing inflation include labor market slack
(the unemployment rate), supply dis-
ruptions originating in the volatile food
and energy sectors (as reflected in
movements in the relative prices of
food and energy) and global competi-
tion (as reflected in the price of imports
relative to the price of domestically pro-
duced output). 
Predicting movements in inflation has
proven difficult because movements in
food, energy and import prices are
themselves difficult to predict. For ex-
ample, much of the downward drift in
inflation over the past several years—
which has caught most economists by
surprise—can be attributed to unex-
pected declines in the relative price of
imports.
Chart 5 shows actual four-quarter
changes in the GDP price index along
with the forecasts generated by a model
that factors in past inflation, labor mar-
ket slack, food and energy shocks, and
import prices. For the reasons just dis-
cussed, the model tends to overpredict
inflation in recent years, but the errors
are not generally large. Our forecast for
inflation during 1999 is 1.3 percent—a
Chart 5
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short run.imply higher borrowing costs and have
been associated with credit crunches
and recessions, as shown by the gap
between yields on Baa- and Aaa-corpo-
rate bonds, the latter being the highest
investment-grade bond category (see
Chart 6). Recently this spread has risen
to its post-1982 average, up from the
exceptionally low levels of recent years.
Spreads between Aaa-rated corporate
and below-investment-grade bonds have
widened to above-normal levels, imply-
ing that credit conditions have tightened
more for less well-established bond-
issuing firms.
Investors also demand a prepayment
risk premium—measured by the in-
terest rate gap between Aaa-rated cor-
porate bonds that pose little default risk
and Treasury bonds—for the possibility
that borrowers will refinance their debt
if interest rates fall. These bonds differ
because when interest rates fall, Aaa
bonds tend to be called and refinanced,
whereas U.S. Treasuries are not. Pre-
payment risk premiums reflect interest
rate and refinancing uncertainty but are
not closely linked to recessions (Chart
7). Relative to default risk premiums,
there has been a more pronounced rise
in the gap between Aaa corporate and
Treasury bond yields.
Sometimes this interest rate spread
includes a higher liquidity premium to
compensate investors for the fact that
uries and Baa-rated corporate bonds,
the lowest risk category of investment-
grade bonds (Chart 6 ). However, this
spread has default- and prepayment-
risk-premium components that behave
differently, implying that the overall
spread can give a false recession alarm.
Default risk premiums, measured by
the gap between yields on low- and
high-grade bonds, compensate inves-
tors for the risk that borrowers may not
repay. Rising default premiums often
vestment costs. Second, an associated
jump in uncertainty leads firms to post-
pone or cancel investment and hiring.
Third, the decline in wealth and the 
associated fall in confidence lead peo-
ple to cut spending. For every sustained
dollar drop in equity wealth, annual
consumption spending drops by about
4 cents. Indeed, if the stock price de-
cline in the late summer of 1998 had not
reversed, it appears that GDP growth
would have slowed by 0.5 percentage
point in 1999. Sustained stock price
changes matter because households
typically assess their equity wealth
using a one- to three-year horizon to
screen out stock price volatility. Look-
ing ahead, the pace of stock market
gains and their boost to consumption
will likely slow. In addition, high stock
price valuation suggests that stock
prices are vulnerable and pose a down-
side risk to our forecast.
Another risk is that a credit crunch
could emerge, in which more borrowers
are denied loans or pay higher interest
rates. To gauge the availability of bond
and equity finance, three types of in-
terest rate spreads are relevant: default,
prepayment and liquidity risk indicators.
Some analysts noted in late 1998 that
spreads between interest rates on lower
grade bonds and U.S. Treasuries widened
to levels seen in recessions, as shown
by the gap between yields on U.S. Treas-
Chart 7
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Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  11private instruments are less desirable to
hold than U.S. Treasuries when finan-
cial markets are turbulent and investors
are very risk averse. Some have argued
that the recent rises in prepayment
spreads reflect a flight to quality in
which investors shift from stocks into
the most liquid bond instruments—
Treasuries—thereby bidding down Treas-
ury yields more than private bond yields
and driving spreads up. This may have
also widened the spread between inter-
est rates on Treasury bills and prime
commercial paper that pose virtually no
prepayment or default risk. At one time,
the paper–bill spread was correlated with
recessions, but since the mid-1980s it
has not been closely related to reces-
sions and has given false alarms. Last
fall, liquidity premiums surged and
many firms could not issue commercial
paper, bonds or stock. Partly to ease the
liquidity squeeze, the Federal Reserve
cut the federal funds rate several times.
Since then, the paper–bill spread has
returned to normal levels.
With respect to bank lending, Fed-
eral Reserve surveys in late 1998 found
that after years of easing credit stan-
dards, banks slightly tightened credit
standards for business loans to large and
midsize firms, with smaller changes for
loans to small firms. The patterns sug-
gested that credit standards had been
tightened more for firms with higher
global exposure. Banks reported they
were, on net, more willing to make
consumer loans than they had been 
in the earlier survey. Although willing-
ness to lend is not rising as rapidly as 
in early 1997, it is not falling at a pace
associated with previous recessions and
credit crunches (Chart 8). This pattern
continued in the most recent survey of
January 1999 but with banks reporting
little net change in credit standards for
business loans. Overall, it appears the
United States is in a credit pinch rather
than a crunch. Lending practices are 
returning to more normal levels of risk-
taking.
Conclusion
The U.S. economy will likely grow at
a robust pace in 1999, with a modest 
acceleration in inflation. However, the
potential for further deterioration in
economies overseas and financial mar-
ket disruptions poses downside risks to
this outlook.
— Evan F. Koenig
John Duca
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N JANUARY BRAZIL—the eighth
largest economy in the world—
devalued its currency, initiating the
first financial crisis of 1999. To un-
derstand Brazil’s crisis, it is useful
to examine the economic program
that preceded it.
In 1994, after years of failed price sta-
bilization plans and resulting high infla-
tion, Brazil initiated a stabilization plan
named for its new currency, the real.
Despite some problems, the Real Plan
was cause for optimism. Brazil took
steps to correct a large federal deficit,
reducing funds transferred by the fed-
eral government to the states and munici-
palities and increasing federal income
taxes. Monetary policy became more re-
strained. Finally, Brazil pegged its cur-
rency to the dollar. Pegging involved
using the central bank’s dollar reserves
to buy reais or using the real to buy dol-
lars, whichever was necessary, to con-
trol the number of reais a dollar could
buy.
1 In other words, if the free market
would not supply as many dollars as real
holders wanted at the official exchange
rate, then the government would sup-
ply dollars out of its reserves.
By pegging its currency, Brazil was
sending a signal not only about its cur-
rency but also about its monetary policy.
To effectively peg its currency to the
dollar, a country must follow a mone-
tary policy parallel to that of the United
States. If Brazil were to peg to the dollar
and run a significantly more inflationary
monetary policy than the United States,
the difference between its inflation rate
and U.S. inflation would ultimately cause
intolerable stresses for its currency sys-
tem; that is, U.S. prices expressed in
reais would become cheap to Brazil-
ians, but Brazilian prices expressed in
dollars would be expensive to U.S. con-
sumers. Everyone would buy American
and no one would buy Brazilian. Brazil
suspected it could not match U.S. mone-
tary or inflation policy exactly, so it
maintained a crawling peg. This meant
the exchange rate would be allowed to
slide, but within limits.
The pegged exchange rate plus the
other aspects of the Real Plan did send
an important message to the world:
Brazil was making a persistent effort to
control inflation and was achieving its
goal. In 1994, the year the Real Plan
began, Brazil’s annual inflation rate ex-
ceeded 900 percent. By the end of 1998,
price movements were negative.
Despite the plan’s success, however,
the controlled devaluation built into
Brazil’s crawling peg was not enough to
offset the cumulative differences be-
tween U.S. and Brazilian inflation rates.
This overvaluation of the real made it
harder to sell Brazilian products abroad
because they were so expensive in dol-
lars, and also motivated more Brazilians
to shop abroad.
Financial Contagion
Another event aggravated the fiscal
problems the country had hoped to 
address with programs linked to the
Real Plan. Brazil began to suffer from 
financial contagion, in part because of
worries about its overvaluation. Conta-
gion occurs when a financial crisis in
one country motivates investors to re-
move their funds from other—perhaps
similar—countries as well. When finan-
cial crises swept Asia in 1997 and Russia
in 1998, investors who were pulling their
investments out of those countries also
began to withdraw them from Brazil. To
discourage the outflow of dollars,
which the central bank would have to
supply to maintain the pegged exchange
rate, Brazil raised interest rates—a step
intended to entice investors to hold their
money in Brazil to earn high interest
rates. Chart 1 reveals Brazilian interest
rate surges, which reflect investor nerv-
ousness during the Korean and Russian
financial crises.
The large increases in Brazilian inter-
est rates, however, were not enough to
keep foreign currency in the country.
To maintain its pegged exchange rate,
Brazil also had to devote much of its
foreign currency reserves to defend the
real. Dollar reserves, which had peaked
at more than $70 billion at the begin-
ning of 1998, dropped by half that
amount by year’s end.
A growing fiscal deficit frightened in-
vestors. Chart 2 breaks down the deficit
between the portion attributed to interest
payments—marked  interest—and the
portion—labeled  primary —that is the
difference between government expen-
ditures on goods and services and the
government’s income from taxes and
fees. The primary deficit is not large on














1/4/99 9/4/98 4/17/98 11/28/97 7/11/97 2/21/97 10/4/96
















1998 1997 1996 1995
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Page  13a year-to-year basis, but the year-in/
year-out accumulation of these deficits
by a country that has a history of debt
moratoriums can worry investors—espe-
cially in the context of financial crises in
Asia and Russia. Nevertheless, even some
usual measures of overall indebtedness,
such as the debt–gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) ratio, did not suggest an ex-
isting crisis.
While the primary deficit was not
large, the increases in interest rates
made the overall deficit much greater.
Last year, the two parts of the deficit—
the primary and interest portions—
summed to about 8 percent of GDP.
That, together with signs that the pri-
mary deficit problems might continue,
made investors nervous. Increasingly
uncomfortable with Brazilian debt in
any case, debtholders became particu-
larly more reluctant to hold longer-term
Brazilian debt. The ratio of short-term to
total Brazilian debt increased markedly.
The Endgame to Devaluation
As problems became more acute in
1998, some well-known economists—
but not all of them—began to call
openly for a Brazilian devaluation. After
the re-election of President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso last fall, hopes began
to rise that he could effectively address
Brazil’s budgetary difficulties. He an-
nounced a new budget plan to save
about $23 billion. Some analysts began
to forecast federal primary surpluses for
1999. A $41.5 billion International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) pre-emptive program
was announced to assure currency specu-
lators that attacks on the real would not
be warranted.
Then hopes began to fade. In Decem-
ber, a deficit reduction bill was voted
down, in part by members of the presi-
dent’s own coalition. A significant pen-
sion reform effort failed. Meanwhile, still
in December, the rate of capital out-
flows accelerated rapidly, to as much as
$350 million per day.
If a particular event could be said to
have triggered Brazil’s devaluation, it
was the announcement by the new gov-
ernor of the Brazilian state of Minas
Gerais that he would suspend his state’s
debt payments to Brazil’s national gov-
ernment for three months. Capital out-
flows accelerated even more rapidly. 
By mid-January, Brazil announced that
pegging was over and its exchange rate
would be allowed to float.
What Next?
What are the implications of Brazil’s
crisis for the United States, and for Texas
in particular? Although about 20 percent
of U.S. trade is with Latin America,
Brazil accounts for only about 2 percent
of total U.S. exports and 1 percent of
total imports. Similarly, Texas sends
only 2 percent of its total exports to
Brazil. For Texas, direct trade effects of
the crisis will be small. Brazil’s trade
links with Texas’ chief trading partners,
Canada and Mexico, are also extremely
limited.
Does this mean Brazil will have no
international impact? Weakness in Brazil
will have impacts on its chief trading
partners, of which Argentina is a pri-
mary example. But a broader concern is
that while Brazil had been subject to
contagion effects, it might now trigger
them. Although such effects were evi-
dent in some Latin American markets
immediately after the onset of Brazil’s
crisis, they appear to have subsided. For
now, the principal focus with respect to
Brazil’s problems is Brazil itself, where
the economy is already in recession. In
the wake of the devaluation and float,
Brazil began to approve fiscal reforms,
including much-needed pension re-
forms. Of particular interest will be the
new IMF agreement, debt negotiations
between state governors and the na-
tional government, and further congres-
sional actions to address the central
government’s fiscal deficit. All these fac-
tors will be significant as Brazil attempts
to resolve its crisis.
— William C. Gruben
Sherry Kiser s Note
1 In Portuguese, the national language of Brazil, the plural form of
words ending in the letter l is typically is. Under this rule, because
one unit of Brazilian currency is a real, we refer to more than one 
as reais.
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Further Information 
on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
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SWE SWE SWE Regional Update Regional Update
HE REGION’S ECONOMY continues to grow at a very
healthy rate. Strong growth in services and construc-
tion has countered less robust manufacturing activity
and weakening energy-related activity. This growth
has kept labor market conditions tight and unem-
ployment rates low. Construction labor, in particular,
remains in short supply, but this may change in coming
months with slower growth in commercial construction.
During the last part of 1998, a pullback in lending for spec-
ulative building caused a drop in Texas construction contract
values. However, with many buildings under construction,
real estate contacts expect completions of new office build-
ings to outpace leasing in the coming year, pushing occu-
pancy rates down about 1 to 3 percentage points. Some office
rent concessions of up to four free months have already been
T
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI** Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
1/99 — 126.9 161.1 511.9 1,104.5 1,537.3 5,757.7 9,072.5 1,899.3 728.6
12/98 120.7 127.5 162.2 507.1 1,103.9 1,527.2 5,738.8 9,039.2 1,903.5 724.4
11/98 120.1 128.5 162.6 505.8 1,103.8 1,525.7 5,723.4 9,021.3 1,899.6 724.1
10/98 122.0 128.6 164.2 503.4 1,105.4 1,521.5 5,705.8 9,000.3 1,895.3 722.7
9/98 119.9 129.1 165.5 500.4 1,106.0 1,518.4 5,693.1 8,983.4 1,895.7 721.1
8/98 120.6 129.7 166.7 500.5 1,106.2 1,511.8 5,678.5 8,963.7 1,894.2 721.4
7/98 123.1 129.9 167.4 497.4 1,103.8 1,502.5 5,661.1 8,932.2 1,895.7 721.2
6/98 123.4 129.7 168.1 493.4 1,108.0 1,499.6 5,650.2 8,919.3 1,891.8 720.8
5/98 124.6 130.0 168.5 491.9 1,107.3 1,501.4 5,633.4 8,902.5 1,892.2 720.2
4/98 124.6 128.6 168.5 490.4 1,107.3 1,497.1 5,619.1 8,882.4 1,892.0 721.8
3/98 124.4 129.1 170.1 484.4 1,107.1 1,498.8 5,601.2 8,861.6 1,880.4 719.7
2/98 124.9 128.9 170.6 483.0 1,105.3 1,497.3 5,582.9 8,839.1 1,879.0 718.1
* in thousands
** Texas Industrial Production Index
s
reported this year in Dallas and Houston. Free apartment rent
of one or two months is also becoming quite common in
some areas as a means of attracting new renters, but this has
not yet caused a slowdown in apartment construction.
Low oil and natural gas prices continue to take their toll on
the energy industry. Unseasonably warm weather and high in-
ventories have pushed natural gas prices about 20 percent
lower than last year’s levels. Oil prices, which had reached
highs above $25 per barrel in 1997, are now at about $12 per
barrel, which is below the cost of drilling for many Texas pro-
ducers. Slower drilling activity has reduced the number of
Texas oil rigs by half over the past year. Texas oil and gas ex-
traction jobs have declined 5 percent over the past 12 months
as energy firms continue to lay off workers.
—Sheila DolmasSWE SWE SWE Announcing Announcing









More information than ever before, including:
• Expand Your Insight—explores timely topics
ranging from global economy and money and
banking to free enterprise and technology.
• Financial Services—information including
Eleventh District ACH, cash and check services.
• Center for Latin American Economics—compre-
hensive economic resources for each country.
• Expanded sections for Economic Research, 
Banking Supervision, the Dallas Fed and Federal
Reserve System, Economic Education and 
Community Affairs.
• All your favorite Dallas Fed publications.
• Plus much more!
Visit us online at www.dallasfed.org.
The Dallas Fed web site has a bold new look, a whole new outlook.